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BRINGING MEANING TO FIRST NATIONS CONSULTATION IN THE BRITISH COLUMBIA SALMON
AQUACULTURE INDUSTRY
MARK RAPPAPORT†

ABSTRACT
One aspect of the legal relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal
duty that the Crown owes towards Aboriginal people. The recent Supreme
Court of Canada decision of Haida v. British Columbia brings the duty

the duty to consult: is it merely procedural in nature, or do First Nations
have a substantive right to consultation? The extent of consultation and
accommodation will be determined proportionally to the strength of
the claim and the seriousness of the potential infringement. The Haida
effect reconciliation between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, as
has been established in previous Canadian Aboriginal jurisprudence.
aquaculture regulation is divided amongst several government agencies.
This paper explores the question of how much input Aboriginal peoples
should have and what the nature of accommodation might look like if an
Aboriginal band were to protest salmon aquaculture in its territory.

† Mark Rappaport (B.Sc., University of Victoria) received his LL.B. from Dalhousie Law
School in 2005..
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The salmon aquaculture industry in British Columbia has been wrought
with controversy from its infancy.1 At the heart of this controversy are
questions surrounding the industry’s sustainability, including its effects
2
Traditionally, governture industry is serviced under various Constitutional heads of power,
resulting in a regulatory regime that is haphazardly divided between the
Federal and Provincial governments.3 In order to address this lack of
vertical integration, the Provincial and Federal governments signed a
coordination duties.4 Conspicuously absent from the Memorandum of
Understanding, however, was mention of a role for First Nations to play
in regulating the industry.5
In this paper I will discuss the Crown’s legal obligations and the
ditional approach toward consultation. I will examine how the recent
decision of Haida v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests)6 could be
used as a tool by decision-makers to help facilitate reconciliation of
Crown and Aboriginal interests in the context of salmon farming in British Columbia.

I. DEFINING THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP
Prior to 1982, the rights of Aboriginal peoples in Canada could be abolished by an Act of Parliament. In an attempt to protect Aboriginal inter1

ums on issuing licences and several government reviews of the industry. See British Columbia
Salmon Aquaculture Review Summary, vol. 1
(Victoria: Queens Printer, 1997) at 1-3.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
David VanderZwaag, Gloria Chao and Mark Covan, “Canadian Aquaculture and the Principles
of Sustainable Development: Gauging the Law and Policy Tides and Charting a Course” (2002)
28 Queen’s L.J. 279.
5
British Columbia, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, “Salmon Aquaculture Review
Final Report”, online: Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries <http://www.agf.gov.bc.ca/
6

245 D.L.R. (4th) 33, 2004 SCC 73 [Haida].
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ests from the arbitrary will of the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada
ture, in Guerin v. The Queen.7
relationship as overly patriarchal, the Guerin decision established a legal principle for assessing the legitimacy of Crown actions with respect
to Aboriginal peoples. After Guerin, the Crown was legally required to

8

In 1982, Aboriginal rights were elevated to Constitutional status
through s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.9 While entrenching Aboriginal rights in the Constitution has indeed helped to protect them from
the political whims of the majority, it has also placed the heavy burden
terpreting section 35 rights was established by the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Sparrow.10 Dickson, C.J. and La Forest, J. concluded
11

Further, the Court created a four-part
test to assess the legitimacy of Crown actions, whether those actions
interfered with the interests of an Aboriginal right and, if so, whether

right and infringement; the onus then shifts to the Crown to prove that
the right has been extinguished or, alternatively, that the interference is
12
In Sparrow the Musqueam Band was successful in proving
13
ment had interfered with it. In interpreting the nature of s. 35(1) rights,
the court clearly stated that they should “be construed in a purposive
way [and that] a generous, liberal interpretation of the words in the con7

[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
Roberts v. R., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245, 220 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at para. 81.
9
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
10
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at para. 62, [1990] 4 W.W.R. 410 [Sparrow].
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
8
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stitutional provision” should be given. In other words, section 35 rights
should not be interpreted as being frozen in time.14 Moreover, Dickson
C.J. in Sparrow notes that,
[s]ection 35(1) at the least provides a solid constitutional base upon
which subsequent negotiations can take place … it calls for just
settlement of Aboriginal peoples … Moreover, the crown is under a
moral if not a legal duty to negotiate in good faith.15

In R. v. Van der Peet, the Supreme Court of Canada elaborated on the
nature of section 35(1), noting that its fundamental purpose is “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”16
has been the determination of the nature and scope of the Crown’s duty
to consult Aboriginal peoples regarding potential infringements. The
content of the duty to consult for established title claims was addressed
in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia. There, Dickson C.J., for the majority, held that:
[t]he nature and scope of the duty of consultation will
vary with the circumstances. In occasional cases, when
the breach is less serious or relatively minor, it will be
no more than a duty to discuss important decisions that
will be taken with respect to the land held pursuant to
Aboriginal title. Of course, even in these rare cases when
the minimum acceptable standard is consultation, this
consultation must be in good faith, and with the intention
of substantially addressing the concerns of the Aboriginal
peoples whose land are at issue. In most cases, it will
cases may even require the full consent of an Aboriginal
nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting and
17

14

Ibid. at para. 56.
Ibid. at para. 53.
16
R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 31, [1996] 9 W.W.R. 1 [Van der Peet].
17
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at para. 168, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
15
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While these decisions shed a great deal of light on the legal relationship

obligation to consult with First Nations in the context of the salmon
aquaculture industry? Is the requirement procedural or do First Nations
have a substantive right to consultation? Does the obligation to consult
exist at all if the potentially affected Aboriginal right has not yet been
proven in law? How will the obligation to consult be affected if it is unclear whether salmon farming could infringe upon a claimed right? For
the remainder of this paper I will address these questions in an attempt
ture decision-making process.

II. HAIDA AND THE DUTY TO CONSULT
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent unanimous decision in Haida
18
ing “grounded in the honour of the Crown.” Chief Justice McLachlin
noted that while section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, “represents a
promise of rights recognition … a corollary of s. 35 [is that] the Crown
19
The reason for
this is twofold. First, “it is always assumed that the Crown intends to
20
Second, the Crown must act honourably if it is to
achieve the purpose of s.35, that is, “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”21
Chief Justice McLachlin further states that, “the honour of the Crown
gives rise to different duties in different circumstances. Where the Crown
22

Where it has not,
the honour of the Crown implies “a duty to consult and, if appropriate,
accommodate,”23 if an Aboriginal right or title may be infringed.
18

Supra note 6 at para. 16.
Supra note 6 at para. 20.
20
Supra note 6 (quoting from R. v. Badger [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, 4 W.W.R. 447 at para. 41).
21
Supra note 6 at para. 17 (quoting from Van der Peet at para. 31).
22
Supra note 6 at para. 18.
23
Supra note 6 at para. 20.
19
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The Court then addressed the Crown’s argument that a legally enforceable duty to consult does not exist until a right has been proven.
Chief Justice McLachlin stated at paragraph 33:
[t]o limit reconciliation to the post-proof sphere risks treating
reconciliation as a distant legalistic goal, devoid of the “meaningful
content” mandated by the “solemn commitment” made by the
also risks unfortunate consequences. When the distant goal of proof
resources changed and denuded. This is not reconciliation. Nor is it
honourable.24

As to when, precisely, the duty to consult arises, the Court cites Halfway
River First Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) and states,
“the duty arises when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of
the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates
conduct that might adversely affect it.”25
Chief Justice McLachlin then addresses the issues of the scope and
content of the duty to consult and accommodate. Essentially, she notes
that the scope of the duty to consult is proportional to the strength of
the claim and the seriousness of the potential infringement.26 At one end
of the spectrum, where the asserted right is tenuous and the potential
by merely “giving notice, disclosing information, and discussing any
issues raised in response to the notice.”27 In these situations the duty to
consult appears to be primarily procedural in nature. At the other end of
the spectrum, where an Aboriginal claimant has a “strong prima facie”
of the claimant may have to be accommodated rather than merely consulted.
Accommodation in the context of a strong prima facie claim and a
submissions for consideration, formal participation in the decision-mak24

Supra note 6 at para. 33.
Supra note 6 (quoting from Halfway River [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 45, [1998] 4 W.W.R. 283
(B.C.S.C), at para. 35).
26
Supra note 6 at para. 39.
27
Supra note 6 at para. 43.
25
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ing process, and provision of written reasons [by the Government] to
show that Aboriginal concerns were considered and to reveal the impact
they had on the decision.”28 While at this end of the spectrum the right
clear that “this process does not give Aboriginal groups a veto over what
29
According to
McLachlin C.J.,
[t]he controlling question in all situations is what is required
to maintain the honour of the Crown and to effect reconciliation
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples with respect to the
interests at stake. Pending settlement, the Crown is bound by its
honour to balance societal and Aboriginal interests in making
decisions that may affect Aboriginal claims.30

I will now examine how this balancing of societal and Aboriginal interests might play out in the salmon aquaculture context.

III. THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND SALMON AQUACULTURE
POLICY
The manner in which the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate
Aboriginal peoples may affect salmon aquaculture policy is guided by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Haida. For the remainder of this paper I will address the issues of how and when decision makers should
consult Aboriginal people, the level of input Aboriginal peoples should
have in the decision making process, and how a Minister’s decision to
grant salmon aquaculture licenses and tenures could be affected by a
band who protests salmon aquaculture. Further, I will argue that the
duty to consult and accommodate could compel the Crown to adopt best
management practices regarding salmon farming, including subsidizing
closed system aquaculture facilities, in limited situations.

28

Supra note 6 at para. 44.
Supra note 6 at para. 42.
30
Supra note 6 at para. 45.
29
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1. When and how should aboriginal peoples be consulted
regarding proposed salmon aquaculture projects?
While the Crown argued in Haida and Taku River31 that a legal obligation to consult did not exist until the Aboriginal claimant had proven an
Aboriginal right, they amended their Provincial Policy for Consultation
those cases. Those decisions held that there was in fact a duty to consult
prior to the proven existence of an Aboriginal claim.32 Accordingly, the
British Columbia Provincial Crown’s Policy for Consultation with First
Nations now acknowledges that, “the depth of consultation and degree
to which workable accommodations should be attempted will be proportional to the soundness of that interest.”33 The Crown’s policy also
acknowledges that, “consultation should be carried out as early as possible in the decision-making process.”34 Both of these principles uphold
the honour of the Crown and are consistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Haida.
Because the regulation of salmon aquaculture is divided amongst
so many different government agencies, one is left to question how the
consultation process is administered to achieve a consistent result. Currently, there are two major provincial agencies, one provincial Crown
Corporation and one federal agency that are responsible for regulating
the industry. The B.C. Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection regulates the use of water permits, Land and Water B.C. Inc. issues land
use tenures, the B.C. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods issues aquaculture licenses, and the Federal Department of Fisheries and
Oceans issues permits under the Navigable Waters Protection Act35 and

31

Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director) (2002), 211
D.L.R. (4th) 89 (B.C.C.A.) rev’d (2004) 245 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Taku River].
32
Land and Water British Columbia Inc., “Aboriginal Interests Consideration Procedures” (Sept.
8, 2003), online: Land and Water British Columbia <ww.lwbc.bc.ca/04community/fn/docs/aicp.
pdf >. Refers to the BCCA decisions in Haida and Taku and states that the Provincial Policy for
Consultation with First Nations, October, 2002 takes into account those decisions.
33
Government of British Columbia, “B.C. Provincial Policy for Consultation with First Nabc.ca/tno/down/consultation_policy_fn.pdf> at 25.
34
Ibid. at 19.
35
R.S.C. 1985, c. N-22.
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the Fisheries Act.36 Environment Canada may also become involved if
issuance of a Federal permit triggers an environmental assessment.37
While it may not be necessary for all agencies to consult in the most
element of honourable consultation. Traditionally, each agency responsible for granting a permit or issuing a license consulted with potentially
affected First Nations groups separately. Recently, however, there has
been a move toward an integrated consultation process. The Provincial and Federal governments are currently working on a harmonized
consultation policy for aquaculture that will be available some time
in 2005.38 It is anticipated that this move toward integration will enhance the consistency of the consultation process and the honour of the
Crown’s conduct.
2. What level of input should aboriginal peoples have in the
decision making process?
Although the answer to this question depends on the context of the situation, a few broad generalizations can be made. First, as the obligation
to consult is proportional to the strength of the asserted claim and the
or title that could be affected. In the context of a salmon aquaculture
for wild salmon.
It is likely that many coastal First Nations groups will be able to espurposes. This is supported by several factors. First, as Philip Drucker
notes in his book
“exploitation of
39

In addition, salmon were spir-

all the priest-conducted rites of group interest, the most important was
36

R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, cited in VanderZwaag, supra note 4.
VanderZwaag, supra note 4 at para. 47.
38
Interview of Sean Herbert, Aquaculture Manager for BC Ministry of Water, Land and Air
Protection, (Nov. 22, 2004).
39
Philip Drucker,
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing
Company, 1965) at 11.
37
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40

Accordingly,

Coast peoples since before contact with Europeans.41
Moreover, Aboriginal claimants are not required to produce indisputable evidence from pre-contact times to establish an Aboriginal right
or title. Rather, the evidentiary burden requires the claimant to prove
claims “on the basis of cogent evidence establishing their validity on
the balance of probabilities.”42 For example, in Heiltsuk Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Sustainable Resource Management), Justice
Gerow accepted the oral history of the Heiltsuk at face value and determined that they had “a strong prima facie case of Aboriginal rights to
43

the Sparrow decision itself, in which the Musqueam band successfully
purposes.44 Second is the Department of Fisheries and Oceans AborigiSparrow decision in a broader
mercial sector.
Therefore, assuming that it will be likely that many bands will be able
to establish a strong prima facie
ating question becomes: What is the likelihood that a decision to grant a
salmon aquaculture license will infringe the Aboriginal right to harvest
wild salmon? As noted above, the onus is on the Aboriginal claimant to
prove the likelihood of an infringement. In order to answer this question
it is imperative to establish a detrimental link between farmed salmon

40

Ibid. at 94.
‘Central and integral since pre-contact times’ is the test to establish section 35(1) Aboriginal
rights as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Van der Peet, supra note 16 at para. 44.
42
Mitchell v. Minister of National Revenue [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at para.
51.
43
Heiltsuk Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Sustainable Resource Management) (2003),
19 B.C.L.R. (4th) 107 (S.C.) at para. 64 [Heiltsuk].
44
Supra note 10.
41
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of public opposition to salmon farming, there is also a great deal of sciHowever, McLachlin C.J. states in Haida this is not as problematic as it
may seem. She maintains that
content to the duty, not by denying the existence of a duty.”45
hensive assessment of salmon aquaculture practices. The study evaluatthe impact of escaped farm salmon on wild stocks, disease in wild and
pacts of farms on coastal mammals and other species, and the situating
of salmon farms. The conclusions of the Salmon Aquaculture Review
(SAR) were as follows:
[s]almon farming in B.C., as presently practiced and at current
production levels, presents a low overall risk to the environment.
First, continuing concern about localized impacts on benthic
suggests the need for additional measures to protect them. Second,
conclusions are based point to the need for monitoring and research
in areas such as the potential impacts of escaped farmed salmon
disease pathogens, potential for disease transfer … Science rarely
severity of the consequences of human interactions with complex
ecosystems … Direction is provided by the precautionary principle
which advocates the consideration and anticipation of the potential
negative impacts of an activity before it is approved.46

Thus, at the time of the SAR’S conclusion (in 1997) it would have been
45
46

Supra note 6 at para. 37.
Supra note 1 at 4.
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ary approach toward the industry, the SAR implies that some risk to
wild salmon exists. Still, the duty to consult would likely fall closer to
the procedural end of the spectrum as the risk of infringing the right to
harvest wild salmon appeared low.
Since the SAR, however, there has been new research to indicate
than previously believed. Two recent observations support this conclusion. First, in 1997, PhD student John Volpe discovered that escaped
Atlantic salmon have spawned in several rivers on Vancouver Island
lations. In laboratory experiments Volpe also determined that Atlantic
salmon out-compete their native niche equivalent, the steelhead salmon.
His experiments suggest that Atlantic salmon pose a greater risk to wild
salmon than was previously believed.47
One year later, Alexandra Morton, a biologist who lives in the
Broughton Archipelago, became alarmed at the negative effects of the
normally large number of sea lice that she discovered on juvenile pink
salmon, and that she believed was attributable to a disease outbreak
in the local farms. She presented her evidence to the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans, but they denied that anything was wrong. Two
years later when the age class of pink salmon returned to the Broughton
Archipelago the stock had collapsed from 3.5 million to 147,000, a reduction of 96% from previous years.48 As a result, the DFO has begun
researching the sea lice problem in the area but has not yet attributed the
49
While Morton’s research is circumstantial, a number of reputable scientists agree with her conclusions.
In 2000 both Morton and Volpe undertook a study to determine the
number of Atlantic salmon that had escaped in Management Area 12
and the degree of risk that farmed Atlantics posed to the natural environVHF and
47

John P. Volpe. Invasion Ecology of Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar) in British Columbia. Ph.D.
Thesis. University of Victoria, B.C. 2001.
48
Earth Crash Earth Spirit, online: <http://eces.org/articles/000003.php> and Prince Rupert.
com, North Coast’s Regional Information Site, online: <http://www.princerupert.com/economy/Morton_responds_Hagen.htm>.
49
troduction to and Weekly Results of the Marine Research Project in 2004,” online: <http://
www-sci.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/mehsd/sea_lice/2004/2004_intro_e.htm>.
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by visiting boats during commercial salmon openings from August 2,
2000 to September 22, 2000. During that period a total of 10,826 Atlan50

These three new discoveries demonstrate that the risk posed by
salmon farming to wild salmon is greater than previously believed.
for salmon has increased with new evidence, so too should the Crown’s
corresponding duty to consult. If we assume that more evidence will
accumulate, the level of consultation required by the Crown to issue
salmon farm permits would likely reach the level of accommodation.
The Provincial Policy for Consultation with First Nations acknowledges
the responsibility to accommodate where a sound case for Aboriginal
rights has been established and there appears to be a likelihood that the
decision may result in an infringement of those interests.51 However, the
Crown’s policy does not detail what ‘accommodation’ means in practice. For this we can turn to Haida for guidance: accommodation may
include formal participation in the decision making process but does
not constitute a right to veto. Accordingly, in the hypothetical situation
where an Aboriginal claimant has a strong prima facie
for wild salmon and the likelihood of infringing that right by issuing a
likely be granted some say over how the project proceeds.
3. How will the decision to grant a salmon farm license be affected
by a band that protests salmon aquaculture in its territory?
Evaluating the B.C. Supreme Court’s decision in Heiltsuk in conjunction with Haida will shed some light on this question. In Heiltsuk, the
Heiltsuk Nation brought an application for judicial review asking the
Court to quash the Minister’s decision to grant licenses to Omega Salmterritory. The Heiltsuk claimed unproven Aboriginal rights and title to

50

Alexandra Morton and J.P. Volpe, “A description of Atlantic Salmon Salmo salar in the Pa-

102-110, 2002.
51
Supra note 33 at 32 and 33.
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the land where the hatchery was located, and opposed any type of Atlantic salmon aquaculture in their territory.52 The Heiltsuk claimed that
they had not been adequately consulted with, and that the decision to

In assessing the nature of the Heiltsuk’s claim, Justice Gerow accepted the oral history of the Heiltsuk at face value and determined that
they had “a strong prima facie
area.”53 The Court then turned to whether the Heiltsuk had shown an
infringement of their claimed right. Here, the band failed to produce
enough evidence showing that the proposed activity would infringe
posed facility was land based and, as such, the likelihood of interaction
54
Supporting this conclusion was the fact that the discharge pipe from the
hatchery to the ocean would have a triple screening system.55 The Heiltimpact the marine environment in an adverse way.56 Given that the Minresult in “a harmful alteration, disruption, or destruction (HADD
habitat,”57 and that the hatchery was regulated under the Land-Based
Fin Fish Waste Control Regulation,58 Justice Gerow concluded that the
Heiltsuk had not established a potential infringement.
tice Gerow highlighted the fact that Heiltsuk had a reciprocal duty to
consult with the Crown.59 Still, while the Crown later acknowledged
their obligation to consult, they did not initially consult with the Heiltsuk regarding the licenses.60 Omega, however, was willing to consult
and had made many attempts to do so.61 For Justice Gerow, the consulta52

Supra note 43 at para. 108.
Supra note 43 at para. 64.
54
Supra note 43 at para. 95.
55
Supra note 43 at para. 94.
56
Supra note 43 at para. 93.
57
Supra note 43 at para. 91.
58
Supra note 43 at para. 91.
59
Supra note 43 at para. 104-105.
60
Supra note 43 at paras. 98 and 102.
61
Supra note 43 at para. 100.
53
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tion was not effective because the Heiltsuk were “opposed to any type
of Atlantic salmon aquaculture in the territory over which they [were]
asserting a claim … [and] have been unwilling to enter into consultation regarding any type of accommodation concerning the hatchery.”62
Justice Gerow was skeptical that that the right to consultation contained
a right to veto use of the land and, since Haida, it is clear that the right
to consultation of an unproven right indeed does not carry with it a right
to veto.63
In the end, however, Justice Gerow adjourned the Heiltsuk’s request
to quash the Minister’s decision until adequate consultation had taken
place. He also dismissed the application to grant an interim or interresources into the project and the Heiltsuk did not bring their petition to
the Court in a timely manner.64
The Heiltsuk decision is useful because it provides some guidance
for the hypothetical situation outlined above. Would the Court’s decision have been different if the Heiltsuk were located somewhere in the
Broughton Archipelago and the licenses being contested were for an
ocean-based Atlantic salmon farm? Assuming the band could establish
a strong prima facie
evidence accumulates to suggest that farmed salmon are detrimental
to wild salmon, it seems likely that the Crown’s obligation to consult
would reach the level of accommodation. Since accommodation does
As Chief Justice McLachlin states in Haida,
[w]here a strong prima facie case exists for the claim, and the
consequences of the government’s proposed decision may adversely
require taking steps to avoid irreparable harm or to minimize the
claim.”65

62

Supra note 43 at para. 108.
Supra note 6 at para. 48.
64
Supra note 43 at para. 126.
65
Supra note 6 at para. 47.
63
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The government’s obligation, therefore, would be “to minimize the effects of the infringement,”66 which may mean that injunctions would
be more easily attainable, if the potentialities of the hypothetical are
realized.
By engaging in this question, we must ask what options the Crown
has to minimize the effects of a potential infringement. Over the past
several years the provincial government has experimented with several
closed system salmon aquaculture facilities that prevent Atlantic salmon
67
Both of these mechanisms would
satisfy the government’s obligation to minimize any potential infringement. The traditional problem with closed systems is that they are prohibitively expensive. However, statistics have recently been released
from a pilot project conducted by Marine Harvest Canada in Cusheon
Cove on Saltspring Island – the largest closed system salmon farming
produce closed system Atlantic salmon, operational costs were $0.85/Kg
greater than the traditional open pen systems placed alongside the new
technology as a control. Moreover, the study found several areas where
costs could be reduced in future trials. For example, it is believed that
costs can be reduced by $0.07/Kg by providing a more ready source of
oxygen to aerate the pens.68 While $0.78/Kg represents approximately
25% increase in cost compared to salmon produced through open net
cage farming, it is comparably less than the premium that consumers
pay for organic produce.69
In the hypothetical situation above, it seems reasonable that the
government could meet their obligation to minimize the effects of the
infringement by subsidizing these “best management practices” in areas where Aboriginal bands protest traditional salmon farms. While
Chief Justice McLachlin was clear in Haida that “pending settlement,
the Crown is bound by its honour to balance societal and Aboriginal
66
67

Supra note 6 at para. 47.
Government of British Columbia, “Fisheries and Aquaculture: New Technology”, online:

tech.htm>.
68
Michel Dubreuil, “Economic Performance of Atlantic Salmon in the SEA System II Relative
to Conventional Net Cages”, online: B.C. Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries <www.
69
See e.g. Anna Ross, “Organic Food Prices 2002,” online: <www.domainomania.com/wfa/
downloads/Prices%20Report.pdf>.
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interests in making decisions that may affect Aboriginal claims,”70 she
was also explicit when she stated that “the controlling question in all
situations is what is required to maintain the honour of the Crown and
to effect reconciliation between the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples
with respect to the interests at stake.”71

IV. CONCLUSION
Fostering an environment where salmon aquaculture can proceed in a
manner that supports societal interests and minimizes potential infringements of Aboriginal interests would be consistent with the Supreme Court
of Canada’s decision in Haida. Such an environment would maintain
the honour of the Crown while simultaneously working towards reconciliation between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. While subsidizing
salmon farm operations may meet public opposition, the reality is that
many sectors of the Canadian economy are already heavily subsidized.
For example, the forest industry is subsidized in the range of $3 billion
to $8 billion annually, the fossil fuel industry is subsidized approximately $5.9 billion annually, agriculture was subsidized $5.6 billion in 2000
million in 1996.72 Furthermore, subsidies to the salmon aquaculture industry could be recaptured through eco-labeling of salmon produced
in closed systems and charging a premium for those products.73 Given
current opposition to traditional salmon farming in B.C., it seems likely
that the public would support a new market that minimizes its impact on
the environment. Moreover, a Provincial Aquaculture Policy that promotes closed system salmon farms in limited situations would protect
Aboriginal rights, bring meaning to the consultation process and help
achieve the broader goals of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, through
reconciliation of Crown and Aboriginal interests.

70

Supra note 6 at para. 45.
Supra note 6 at para. 45.
72
David R. Boyd, Unnatural Law: rethinking Canadian environmental law and policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) at 320.
73
M.F. Teisl, B. Roe, and R.L. Hicks, “Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market? Evidence from DolphinSafe Labeling” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (2002), vol. 43, no. 3
at 339-341.
71

